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OPINION OF THE COURT
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge
In December 2002, a car accident paralyzed a foster care
child, I.H. A jury found that his foster father’s negligent driving
caused I.H.’s injury. The single issue before us in this tragic
case is whether a private foster care agency can be vicariously
liable for the ordinary negligence of a foster parent. The District
Court held no, and granted the foster care agency’s motion for
summary judgment on this issue. We affirm.
I. Facts
In November 1998, a court determined I.H., then three
years old, was a “dependent child.” As a result, Lehigh County
took legal and physical custody of him.
With the Lutheran Home at Topton’s assistance, Lehigh
County placed I.H. with foster parents, Peter and Atlanta
Norton.1 The County had contracted with the Home to aid with
foster child placement and related supervision. The Contract of
Service (the “Service Contract”) between the parties imposed

1

In his Amended Complaint, I.H. labeled Topton House,
LLC, Topton Management Services, Inc., and the Lutheran
Home at Topton, collectively, as “the Topton Defendants.”
Topton House, LLC and Topton Management Services, Inc.
were subsequently dismissed from the suit. Only the Lutheran
Home at Topton is before us on appeal.
4

several obligations on the Home, including:
supervising each foster child’s placement;
submitting to the County individual service plans,
progress reports, discharge summaries, and other
written reports required by the County or
regulations pertaining to each foster child;
submitting to the County medical, dental[,] and
educational information; and providing
notification to the County if it proposes changing
a foster child’s placement from one foster home
to another.
In exchange for providing these services, the Home received a
daily fee of $43.75 for each child under its supervision. In turn,
it paid its foster parents $17.00 per day.
Prior to I.H.’s placement, the Home entered into a Foster
Care Placement Contract of Agreement (the “Placement
Agreement”) with the Nortons. In it, the Nortons promised “to
receive a foster child [into their home] . . . and to be responsible
to meet [his] physical, social[,] and emotional needs.” It also
contained baseline requirements intended to guide I.H.’s care.
Many of these provisions incorporated specific items from the
Service Contract (including various state regulations).
However, the Placement Agreement included additional
requirements imposed by the Home itself. The Nortons also
received a Foster Care Handbook (the “Handbook”), which
5

outlined the family’s obligations in greater detail. In the end,
the parties agreed that “it is the responsibility of the Home and
foster family to work together on behalf of [I.H.]” Importantly,
both the Home and the Nortons had the power to terminate the
Placement Agreement with reasonable notice.
At various times the Home was quite active in
supervising I.H.’s care. For instance, shortly after I.H.’s
placement, the Home received reports that the Nortons were
using inappropriate methods to discipline and toilet train him.
These methods violated the Nortons’ obligations under their
Placement Agreement, as well as related Pennsylvania law.2 In
response, the Home met with the Nortons and counseled them
on proper disciplinary methods.
A few months later, I.H. and his foster brothers were
swimming in the Nortons’ pool. They had just returned home
from a party. While unsupervised, I.H. nearly drowned. Mr.
Norton pulled the child from the pool, and Mrs. Norton
administered life-saving CPR. As a result of this incident, the
County and I.H.’s court-appointed guardian instructed the Home
to increase the frequency of its in-house visits with the foster
family. They also directed the Home to provide additional
training to the Nortons and use their supervisory authority to

2

Under Pennsylvania law, foster children may not be
“punish[ed] for bedwetting or actions related to toilet training.”
55 Pa. Code § 3700.63.
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intervene further, as needed.
In December 2002, Mr. Norton was bringing I.H. home
from daycare. During that trip, Mr. Norton was momentarily
distracted when I.H. bit Thomas (Mr. Norton’s son) on the arm.
Mr. Norton glanced in his rearview mirror to see what was
happening and to reprimand the boys. With this distraction, he
crossed the center line of the road and hit an oncoming car.
Thomas was killed, and Mr. Norton was severely injured. I.H.
was rendered paraplegic.
II. Procedural History
In August 2004, I.H., through his guardian ad litem, filed
an action against Mr. Norton, Lehigh County, and the Home to
recover for his injuries. I.H. brought the following claims in his
initial Complaint: 1) ordinary negligence against Norton; 2)
constitutional violations against Lehigh County for alleged
deliberate indifference; and 3) direct liability against the Home
for negligent placement and supervision. Even an Amended
Complaint did not allege that the Home was vicariously liable
for Norton’s negligence, but I.H.’s later summary judgment
motion referred to it.3

3

We may address this issue because the Home was on notice
of the claim, did not argue in our Court that the issue was
waived, and addressed the issue on the merits in its brief to us.
See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
7

In March 2006, I.H. filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. The District Court denied his motion on the ground
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Norton
was negligent. In October 2006, the Home and Lehigh County
filed motions for Partial Summary Judgment. The District Court
granted both motions. In its opinion, the Court addressed the
merits of I.H.’s vicarious liability claim, concluding that it “fails
as a matter of law because the requisite master-servant
relationship does not exist between the Home and Peter
Norton.” The Court reasoned that most of the rules imposed on
Norton in the Placement Agreement and the Handbook were the
product of state regulations. It added that this setting of statemandated standards and goals addressed the results of the work
and not the manner in which it was conducted, leaving the
Nortons free to make the same decisions for I.H. that they would
make for their own children on a daily basis. (The Court further
held that the Home’s actions were not the proximate cause of
I.H.’s injuries. Thus, it was not directly liable for them, either.)
In March 2007, I.H. filed a motion requesting that the
District Court certify its decision for immediate appeal.
Specifically, I.H. sought review of the Court’s determination
that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to
the existence of a master-servant relationship between the Home

Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 1998); and Venuto
v. Carella, Byrne, Bain, Gilfillan, Cecchi & Stewart, P.C., 11
F.3d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1993)).
8

and Norton. After initially denying this request, the Court sua
sponte vacated its decision and certified this matter for appeal.
We denied the request.
I.H.’s claim against Norton continued to trial. The jury
returned a unanimous verdict, finding Norton negligent and
awarding $28,750,000 in damages. After entry of a final
judgment, I.H. appealed the District Court’s summary judgment
order from February 2007. I.H. limited his appeal to the Court’s
dismissal of his vicarious liability claim against the Home.
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear this case under
28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
The standard of review for a grant of summary judgment
is “plenary.” Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1321 (3d
Cir. 1995). When considering a grant of summary judgment, we
employ the same legal standard as the District Court. Kelly v.
TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1192 (3d Cir. 1988).
Summary judgment is only proper where, when viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

9

R. Civ. P. 56(c).4
IV. Analysis
To repeat, the single issue before us is whether a private
foster care agency can be vicariously liable for a foster parent’s
act of ordinary negligence. Although this is an issue of first
impression under Pennsylvania law,5 our conclusion is dictated
4

“Generally, it is a jury question whether a person is an agent
or an independent contractor.” Mahon v. City of Bethlehem, 898
F. Supp. 310, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1995). I.H. thus argues that the
District Court “usurped the jury’s role” by granting summary
judgment in this case. Appellant’s Br. 13. This is overstated.
Both parties concede that the relationship between the Home
and Norton is governed by an agreement between them. See
Appellant’s Br. 10, 22; Appellee’s Br. 3-4, 13. Therefore, the
District Court was within its power to decide whether that
agreement gave rise to a master-servant relationship as a matter
of law. See Cox v. Caeti, 279 A.2d 756, 758 (Pa. 1971)
(“[W]here the facts [underlying an alleged master-servant
relationship] are not in dispute, the question of the relationship
becomes one for determination by the court.”); see also Valles
v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2002);
Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc., 634 A.2d 622 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993).
5

Appellant’s counsel suggested at oral argument that this
case presents a question of first impression for any Circuit Court
of Appeals. See Oral Arg. Tr. 15 (“This is a case of first
10

by well-established legal principles.
A.

The “Master-Servant” Relationship and the “Right of
Control” Test

In Pennsylvania, only a “master-servant” relationship
“gives rise to vicarious liability for negligence.” Smalich v.
Westfall, 269 A.2d 476, 481 (Pa. 1970). “As a general rule, a
master may be held liable for the acts of the servant when those

impression, and it’s all Pennsylvania law.”); see also Appellee’s
Br. 14 (“[T]here is no known Pennsylvania appellate precedent
specifically involving the relationship between a foster care
agency and foster parent . . . .”). Counsel is correct, to our
knowledge. Several states have considered similar questions,
but those cases have focused principally on the relationship
between foster parents and the state. See, e.g., Hunte v.
Blumenthal, 680 A.2d 1231 (Conn. 1996); Nichol v. Stass, 735
N.E.2d 582 (Ill. 2000); Mitzner v. State, 891 P.2d 435 (Kan.
1995); Miller v. Martin, 838 So.2d 761 (La. 2003); Archer v.
DARE Family Servs., No. CA 98-04354, 2002 WL 243649
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2002); Simmons v. Robinson, 409
S.E.2d 381 (S.C. 1991). But see Commerce Bank v. Youth
Servs. of Mid-Ill., Inc., 775 N.E.2d 297 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(addressing the relationship between a foster care agency, foster
parents, and a foster child); M.H. v. Barber, No. C6-99-16, 1999
WL 343806 (Minn. Ct. App. June 1, 1999) (same); McCabe v.
Dutchess County, 895 N.Y.S.2d 446 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
(same).
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acts are committed during the course of his employment and
within the scope of his authority.” Valles v. Albert Einstein
Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1237 (Pa. 2002). The rationale for
this rule is simple: “[B]ecause a master has the right to exercise
control over the physical activities of the servant within the time
of service, he is vicariously liable for the servant’s negligent acts
committed within the scope of his employment.” Smalich, 269
A.2d at 481 (emphasis in original).
In a master-servant relationship, “a master not only
controls the results of the work but also may direct the manner
in which such work shall be done.” Id.; see also Universal AmCan, Ltd. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 762 A.2d 328, 333
(Pa. 2000) (“[C]ontrol over the work to be completed and the
manner in which it is to be performed are the primary factors in
determining employee status.”).6 “[A] servant, in rendering the
6

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also set out several
discrete factors that should be considered in the master-servant
inquiry:
Control of [the] manner work is to be done;
responsibility for result only; terms of agreement
between the parties; the nature of the work or
occupation; skill required for performance;
whether one is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business; which party supplied the tools; whether
payment is by the time or by the job; whether
work is part of the regular business of the
12

agreed services, remains entirely under the control and direction
of the master.” Smalich, 269 A.2d at 481. When determining
whether a master-servant relationship exists, “[a]ctual control of
the manner of work is not essential; rather, it is the right to
control which is determinative.” Drexel v. Union Prescription
Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 785 (3d Cir. 1978).
Under this “right of control” test, “[t]he control of the
principal does not . . . include control at every moment; its
exercise may be very attenuated and, as where the principal is
physically absent, may be ineffective.” Smalich, 269 A.2d at
481 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although
this passage might suggest a lenient “right of control” test, the
right to exercise day-to-day control remains an important factor
in the master-servant inquiry. See, e.g., Smith v. Exxon Corp.,
647 A.2d 577, 583 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Myszkowski v. Penn
Stroud Hotel, Inc., 634 A.2d 622, 626 (Pa. Super. 1993);
Burnatoski v. Butler Ambulance Serv. Co., 567 A.2d 1121, 1124
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). The party seeking vicarious liability
bears the burden of proving a master-servant relationship. See
Basile v. H&R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2000).

employer; and also the right to terminate the
employment at any time.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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B.

Applying the “Right of Control” Test

In this context, the dispute between the parties focuses on
the scope of control that the Home could exercise over
Norton—not the level of control that the Home actually
exercised during I.H.’s placement. I.H. argues that, because
Norton was in the act of caring for him at the time of the
accident, the Home should be held vicariously liable for any
injuries caused by Norton’s conduct. Under this far-reaching
theory, a private foster care agency’s liability would extend to
all acts of ordinary negligence committed by a foster parent in
the provision of foster care—which is defined by relevant
regulations as a “[t]wenty-four hour” commitment. 55 Pa. Code
§ 3700.4.7

7

As the system now stands, private foster care agencies
remain liable for their own acts of negligence—for instance, in
negligently placing a child in an unsuitable environment. It is
simply not true, as I.H. contends, that the District Court’s ruling
allows private foster care agencies to accept payment from the
State and then simply “wash [their] hands of responsibility for
what happens next.” Appellant’s Br. 18. Instead, if a foster care
agency fails to perform its duties in a given case, a direct claim
of negligence can be made out against it for a breach of those
duties—just as I.H. did (albeit unsuccessfully) in this case.
Therefore, a “foster care agency . . . remain[s] liable in those
instances where the breach of its duty ‘to exercise due care in
the selection of foster parents and to oversee diligently the
rendition of proper care by the foster parents’ results in injury.”
14

Such a theory would impose a considerable financial
burden on the Pennsylvania foster care system. 8 More

Blanca C. v. Nassau County, 103 A.D.2d 524, 532-33 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984) (quoting Bartels v. Westchester County, 76
A.D.2d 517, 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
8

Other states have recognized this danger. See, e.g., Stanley
v. State Indus., Inc., 630 A.2d 1188, 1191 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993)
(“To adopt such a [vicarious liability] theory would place an
intolerable burden upon the State and might well diminish the
beneficial effects of the foster parent program and compel a
return to institutional care as the sole means of addressing the
plight of abused and neglected children.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Blanca C., 103 A.D.2d at 532
(warning that placing vicarious liability on the foster care system
could create a “potentially crushing financial burden . . . [that]
might prompt the County to restrict or abolish its foster care
program in favor of institutional placement”); Laura A. Harper,
Note, The State’s Duty to Children in Foster Care—Bearing the
Burden of Protecting Children, 51 Drake L. Rev. 793, 797-98
(2003) (“The child welfare system is severely underfunded . . . .
The inadequacies of this system lie in stark contrast to the
burgeoning population of children in need.”).
The amici in this case present similar arguments. See
Commonwealth’s Br. 3 (“Private, non-profit organizations like
the Lutheran Home play an indispensable role in Pennsylvania’s
foster care system, a role which would be threatened if they are
to be held vicariously liable in situations like this.”);
Pennsylvania Council of Children, Youth and Family Services’
15

importantly, it is also contrary to established Pennsylvania law.
In reaching this conclusion, we first consider the terms of the
Service Contract between Lehigh County and the Home. From
there, we analyze the Placement Agreement between the Home
and Norton. Throughout, we consider these agreements in light
of the regulatory scheme enacted by the Commonwealth, as well
as related Pennsylvania caselaw.
1.

The Service Contract

I.H. stakes much of his argument on a single passage
from the “Independent Contractor” provision of the Service
Contract. In relevant part, this provision states that the Home
“is deemed an Independent Contractor and shall not during the
term of this contract assign, subcontract, transfer, or otherwise
delegate all or part of its obligations or responsibilities without

Br. 12 (“The imposition of vicarious liability on a foster care
agency for the ordinary negligence of a foster parent would have
a dire impact on the financial viability of foster care agencies
and significantly impair the ability of the Commonwealth,
through its counties, to provide an array of care and services to
dependent and delinquent children.”); Pennsylvania Children
and Youth Administrators Association’s (“PCYAA”) Br. 15 (“A
judicial determination that a foster care agency is vicariously
liable for a foster parent’s ordinary negligence would seriously
affect Pennsylvania’s foster family program as it now operates
and would greatly hinder future placement efforts.”).
16

prior written approval of [Lehigh County].” From this, I.H.
argues that the Home had a non-delegable duty to exercise all
control necessary to ensure his safety. On this reading, the
Home committed itself to providing more than initial placement
and ongoing monitoring of established goals; it also must
exercise additional control over the manner of its foster parents’
care (on a daily basis, if necessary). According to I.H., it is thus
no argument that the Home did not exercise this control,
including when supervising I.H.’s care by the Nortons. The
Home had the duty to exercise whatever level of control was
necessary to keep I.H. safe.9

9

These arguments are similar to those made by the
Connecticut Supreme Court in Hunte v. Blumenthal, 680 A.2d
1231 (Conn. 1996). There, the Court explained:
It is true . . . that foster parents currently decide
when the child goes to bed at night, when enough
television time has been had, or when the child
may go swimming. Foster parents have this
discretion, however, only because the department
has chosen not to take it away. Nothing prevents
the department from enacting regulations . . . that
specify the hour at which a child must go to bed,
that limit the amount of television a child may
watch[,] or that restrict the hours a child may
spend in the pool.
Id. at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted). But in Hunte the
17

Scattered provisions of the Service Contract strengthen
this reading. For instance, the “Purpose of [the] Contract”
between the Home and Lehigh County was defined (quite
broadly) as “Residential/Foster Care,” while the Home
elsewhere agreed to provide “Foster Care . . . Services.”
Furthermore, the Home promised to “promote [each] child’s
growth and development by providing the physical care,
nurturance[,] and opportunity [necessary] for individual, social,
emotional[,] and intellectual development.” Finally, the Home
agreed to accomplish these goals by: 1) “provid[ing] a
temporary living environment in the form of foster family care”;
2) “retain[ing] responsibility of [I.H.’s] physical custody”
throughout his placement; and 3) “actively participat[ing] in the
delivery of [related foster care] services.”
Given these provisions, I.H. concludes that the Home was
charged with running a “foster care” program, with non-

Court was considering whether foster parents qualified as state
employees under the state-administered foster care system. In
that case, the state had complete control over the structure of the
foster care system itself.
Here, the Home’s control over Norton is constrained by
the regulatory goals prescribed by the Commonwealth. And
even the Hunte Court conceded that its decision was an outlier.
See id. at 1241 (“We recognize that the majority of courts in
other states that have considered this issue have concluded that
foster parents are not employees of the state.”).
18

delegable responsibilities that extended beyond mere placement
and supervision to additional control over the manner in which
the Nortons cared for I.H. on a daily basis. These textual
arguments, simple and supportive, nonetheless fall short.
First, I.H. reads too much into the “Independent
Contractor” provision. Recourse to it merely begs the key
question on appeal. It provides that the Home “shall not . . .
delegate all or part of its obligations or responsibilities without
prior written approval.” This provision says little about what
those “obligations” and “responsibilities” are. As the Illinois
Supreme Court recently noted in a similar context, “whatever
duty there is to provide placement, to institute procedures, or
even to exercise general authority over foster children[,] is not
the same as a continuing, nondelegable duty to provide for the
care of children placed in foster homes.” Nichol v. Stass, 735
N.E.2d 582, 589 (Ill. 2000).
Furthermore, many of the provisions that I.H. cites apply
equally to a Service Contract providing for foster care placement
and ongoing monitoring rather than one including additional
responsibilities for directing the manner of care the foster
parents need to provide on a daily basis. For instance, the
Home’s purported duty to “provide a temporary living
environment in the form of foster family care” can be met
through placement services. The same is true of the Home’s
obligation to “promote a child’s growth and development by
providing the physical care, nurturance[,] and opportunity
19

[necessary] for individual, social, emotional, and intellectual
development.” And while the Home agreed to “actively
participate in the delivery of services,” this need not extend to
all (or even most) of the Nortons’ day-to-day parenting
decisions. Indeed, this passage itself is part of a larger
paragraph on the role of caseworkers in “monitor[ing]” foster
families.
The Home’s level of control is further clarified by the
following passage, which was part of a program description
incorporated into the Service Contract by the parties: “The
Lutheran Home strives to provide the most stable and caring
environment for children. Proper recruitment and training of
foster parents, careful matching of children and families, and
viable accessible supports for foster parents and foster children
are in place in order to avoid multiple placements.” J.A. 517
(emphasis added). In this passage, the Home defined its key
duties as foster family recruitment, foster child placement, and
ongoing supervision.
Other passages in the program description also aid this
account of the Home’s responsibilities. Among them, the Home
pledged “to provide supportive services to [its] foster families,”
which were intended to “under-gird the foster parents’
effectiveness in providing a stable, nurturing environment for
the foster children in their care.” In addition, the Home put in
place a referral procedure for processing requests from Lehigh
County: “A referral for foster care placement can be made by
20

the county by contacting the foster care supervisor. A verbal
description of [a] child’s [characteristics] . . . [is] necessary in
order to provide the most appropriate foster family setting.”
Importantly, “[a]cceptance of the referral is contingent upon
whether a suitable match can be made between the child and a
foster family and the availability of an opening.” Therefore, if
a “suitable match” with a family were not made, the Home
would not accept a referral from Lehigh County.10
Moreover, within the Home’s program approved foster
families agree to “provide room/board, basic physical care,
health care, and supervision,” as well as provide for the child’s
“developmental needs.” In this role, foster parents must
“participate in the development of the [child’s] [i]ndividual
[s]ervice [p]lan” and “facilitate many of the objectives outlined
in the plan.”
Related regulations provide further support for this
account. Pennsylvania law defines a “foster family care agency”
as “[a] public or private agency which recruits, approves,

10

This process is similarly outlined in the Handbook given to
the Home’s foster parents. See J.A. 557 (“Topton Foster Care
program accepts a child whose needs can be met in a
community-based setting. It is important to address the child’s
specific needs by choosing a foster family that exhibits strengths
in the areas that are vital to the child’s positive growth and
development.”).
21

supervises[,] and places children with foster families.” See 55
Pa. Code § 3700.4. In this capacity, it is a stand-in for the
county, which would typically be responsible for these tasks. At
the same time, a foster family is defined as “[t]he living unit,
including the foster family residence and foster parent, approved
by a foster family care agency to provide foster family care to
children.” Id. Similarly, a foster parent is defined as “[a]n
individual responsible for providing foster family care to
children placed by a[] [foster family care agency].” Id. Within
this scheme, foster families are tasked with “[p]rovid[ing]
temporary, substitute care” for each “child in need.” Id. at §
3130.5.
In addition, the Service Contract itself suggests that it
should be read in light of these regulatory goals, as the
Contract’s “Interpretation” provision provides that it is “the
intention of the [parties] that the public health, safety[,] and
welfare be protected and furthered by the [C]ontract. Therefore,
this [C]ontract is to be interpreted in such manner as to favor
such public interest as opposed to any private interest.” As the
Home’s counsel explained at oral argument, “The [service]
contracts are written in light of [related] code provisions.” Oral
Arg. Tr. 24. Analyzing the Service Contract in light of related
regulations, the Home argues that its duty is to provide “foster
care indirectly through a foster family” and “assist the county in
placing children in foster families.” Id. at 25, 26. The
Pennsylvania Children and Youth Administrators Association
(“PCYAA”) similarly explained, “Private foster care agencies
22

cannot and do not supervise and control the day-to-day . . . care
that a foster parent provides a foster child. Foster care agencies
do not have the power or authority to exercise this type of
control over foster parents.” PCYAA’s Br. 10-11. These
accounts are consistent with the role of a “foster family care
agency” as defined by Pennsylvania’s regulatory scheme.
Taken together, these passages suggest that the Home’s
duties extended only to initial placement and ongoing
supervision of established goals, not to the manner in which the
Nortons chose to achieve each of these goals. Therefore, the
Service Contract, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a
master-servant relationship. Yet this does not end the masterservant inquiry. It is still possible that the Home’s related
supervisory responsibilities give rise to a master-servant
relationship. To that end, we turn to the Placement Agreement
and accompanying Handbook.
2.

The Placement Agreement and the Handbook

Under the Placement Agreement and the Handbook, the
Home had the right to control many facets of I.H.’s care. Under
the Agreement, Norton was assigned a “Topton foster care
caseworker.” 11 In addition, Norton agreed that “[f]requent

11

First, the Home develops “[a] treatment plan,” which is
then “reviewed with the foster family.” Over time, the
Agreement requires the following: 1) after three months, the
23

contacts between the caseworker . . . and the foster parents
[we]re necessary [so] both c[ould] discuss observations,
difficulties, general development, and future plans regarding
[I.H.].” To that end, the Agreement provided for biweekly visits
by the caseworker to the foster home for the first two months of
placement and monthly visits thereafter (“at the discretion of the
caseworker and supervisor”).
Apart from these ongoing visits, the Home also set
various standards for I.H.’s care. In its Handbook, the Home
“detail[ed] foster care practices, foster parent/Topton roles and
responsibilities, and current foster care regulations.” As new
foster parents, the Nortons were required to participate in an
orientation, which outlined “Topton philosophy, practices, foster
parent and Topton’s roles and responsibilities, and applicable
regulations for foster care.” These “practices” and “regulations”
included rules dealing with a foster child’s money, clothing,

caseworker must complete an initial evaluation form and discuss
it with the foster family; 2) “periodic[ally]” the caseworker must
make determinations as to the “suitability of the placement”; and
3) annually the caseworker must make written re-evaluations of
the foster home, with a copy provided to the foster parents. In
the event of revisions to the treatment plan, both I.H. and Norton
“must participate in the planning process, if this is appropriate.”
Furthermore, at the outset “[t]he foster family, county agency
staff, and [the Home] staff must all be in agreement regarding
the appropriateness of the placement.” (emphasis in original).
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medical and dental treatment, education, employment,
transportation, recreation, religious practices, tobacco use, and
vacations. They also included standards that governed its foster
parents on everything from disciplinary practices to the
frequency of photograph-taking. The Home even “reserve[d]
the right to question the adequacy of meals, clothing,
recreational opportunities, or other needs being provided by the
foster family.” In addition to these “paper” provisions, the level
of control that the Home actually exercised during I.H.’s
placement further suggests the limited scope of foster parent
autonomy within the Home’s foster care program—with the
Home’s frequent phone calls and visits (to say nothing of their
direct interventions involving the Nortons and I.H.).
While true that the relationship between Norton and I.H.
was not that of a biological parent and his children,12 this does
not settle the master-servant question. The test is not whether
Norton retained as much control over I.H. as a biological parent;
it is whether the Home had sufficient control over Norton to
result in a master-servant relationship. We hold that it did not.
First, in the Placement Agreement, Norton agreed “to be
responsible for meeting the physical, social[,] and emotional

12

Indeed, in the Placement Agreement, Norton explicitly
“agree[d] . . . that foster family care is not intended to supersede
parental rights, responsibilities, and relationships between the
child and his natural parents.”
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needs of [I.H.]” on an ongoing basis, leaving the Home with the
related responsibility of “assisting” Norton in achieving these
goals. This passage alone suggests a division of labor
inconsistent with a master-servant relationship, with Norton
responsible for daily parenting decisions and the Home merely
responsible for setting goals and providing additional support
(as needed). Under Pennsylvania law, that the Home “set[]
certain standards in order to maintain a uniform quality of . . .
service only addresse[d] the result of the work and not the
manner in which it [wa]s conducted.” Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at
627 (emphases in original). This is insufficient to establish a
master-servant relationship.
Second, in the specific context of transportation, the
Home’s responsibilities under the Service Contract were narrow,
and its control over Norton attenuated: the Home simply agreed
to “guarantee[] all drivers hold a valid, appropriate driver’s
license.” The Placement Agreement is not in tension with this.
Rather than exerting continuous control over Norton’s manner
of driving, the Home stipulated that anyone driving I.H. had to
have a driver’s license and adequate insurance
coverage—subject to certain common-sense (and state-imposed)
safety guidelines.13 Indeed, the Home even permitted other

13

For instance, no one under the age of 18 could transport the
foster child without the permission of either Lehigh County or
the Topton Foster Care Director. Furthermore, the vehicle itself
had to “be validly licensed and inspected,” the number of
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adults to drive I.H., at the discretion of Norton, subject only to
the “expectation” that Norton “knows the driver, the destination,
and is able to validate that the driver has a current motor vehicle
driver’s license and adequate insurance coverage.” Taken
together, these requirements fulfilled the Home’s obligations
under the Service Contract and established less extensive control
over Norton’s transportation responsibilities than in other areas.
Finally, the source of many of the more invasive
requirements within the Placement Agreement was the
Commonwealth itself—either through statute or regulation—not
the Home. Under Pennsylvania law, these requirements alone
do not result in a master-servant relationship. In Universal AmCan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an agreement
between a hauling company and the owner-operator of a tractortrailer did not establish a master-servant relationship. On
examining the agreement between the parties, the Court
observed that its provisions were “for the most part governed by
federal regulations,” including “requirements for mandatory
inspections, for observing speed limits, and for covering loads
with tarps.” Universal Am-Can, 762 A.2d at 334, 335. It added:

passengers in the car could “not exceed the passenger capacity
as determined by the vehicle manufacturer,” and “[s]afety
restraints” had to be “used by occupants.” Finally, the foster
child had to “wear seat belts at all times, or be securely
restrained in an appropriate car seat.” (emphasis in original).
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Factors which demonstrate compliance with
government regulations do not assist in the
application of the [right-of-control] test. The
existence of the regulations precludes [the parties]
from negotiating any terms subject to the
regulations. Neither party has bargaining power,
or the ability to control the work to be done, when
dealing with matters subject to regulation.
Id. at 334-35. As a result, the Court concluded that the
regulations were “not probative” of the master-servant issue, as
they “reflect the control of the government, not the motor
carrier.” Id. at 336.
Because federal and state regulations controlled the
essential elements of the trucker’s work, the Court concluded
that other features of the Agreement (which were not dictated by
government regulations) also fell short of establishing a masterservant relationship.
These additional features included
requirements to communicate with the dispatcher every 12 or 24
hours, submit fuel and toll receipts, and take a mandatory onehour stop for meals. See id. at 337-38 (Cappy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).14

14

Given the holding in Universal Am-Can, it is hardly
surprising that the District Court relied heavily on an analogous
Illinois foster care case, Commerce Bank. There, a three-yearold foster child died while enclosed in a bedroom closet by her
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The Home argues that the same is true here. And,
indeed, the Placement Agreement and Handbook do overlap
with state regulations in many key areas. For instance, the
Pennsylvania Administrative Code reads: “The county agency
shall provide an opportunity for a child placed in a foster home
or child care facility which it administers to participate in
religious activities, services[,] and counseling, taking into
account the choices specified by the parents or guardian or the
child.” 55 Pa. Code § 3130.86. The Placement Agreement

foster parents. The child had been placed with the foster family
by a private foster care agency. Representatives for the foster
child brought a vicarious liability claim against the foster care
agency for the foster parents’ negligence. Much like the Home,
“it was [the agency’s] responsibility to find foster parents, make
sure that the foster parents and their home complied with [state]
licensing requirements, and then monitor the foster children in
accordance with [state] regulations and Illinois law.”
Commerce Bank, 775 N.E.2d at 298. The agency also “provided
services to the children, created plans, distributed state money
to the foster parents, and monitored the foster parents, all
pursuant to [state] regulations.” Id. at 298-99. The Court
concluded that this relationship did not call into play vicarious
liability, even as it conceded that the foster care agency had “the
right to control a great deal of the day-to-day supervision and
parenting of the foster children.” Id. at 301. The agency “was
essentially acting in [the State’s] place” by monitoring statemandated requirements rather than exercising its own control
over its foster parents. Id. at 302.
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largely tracks the Code’s language, providing that “[a]ll children
are to be given reasonable opportunities for religious expression
within the broad religious preferences of their choice or that of
their parents.” This is only one of several examples of how the
Placement Agreement and the Handbook track state regulations.
Others include the regulation of a foster child’s money,15
education,16 safety,17 medical and dental care,18 residence,19

15

Compare J.A. 559 (“Money earned, received as a gift[,] or
received as allowance by a child is the child’s personal
property.”) with 55 Pa. Code § 3130.85 (same).
16

Compare J.A. 565 (“Children who receive services from
our agency shall be enrolled in, or have access to, education in
conformance with the Public School [C]ode of 1949.”) with 55
Pa. Code § 3130.87 (“The county agency shall ensure that
children who are receiving services are enrolled in, or have
access to, education in conformance with the Public School
Code of 1949 . . . .”).
17

Compare J.A. 582 (providing various safety requirements,
including those pertaining to “dangerous material kept in the
home,” emergency phone numbers, fireplaces, smoke detectors,
fire extinguishers, electrical outlets, electrical wires, and
drinking water) with 55 Pa. Code § 3700.67 (same).
18

J.A. 561-62 (outlining the various processes for obtaining
consent for a child’s medical and dental treatment), and J.A. 571
(providing for a physical examination within 30 days of
placement, a dental examination within 60 days of placement,
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grievance procedures,20 transportation requirements,21 and
constraints on parental autonomy (including methods of

and guidelines for future medical and dental appointments), with
55 Pa. Code § 3130.91 (requiring virtually identical processes to
those outlined in the Handbook for obtaining consent for a
child’s medical and dental treatment), and id. § 3700.51
(providing a virtually identical timetable for medical and dental
treatment).
19

Compare J.A. 568 (“Topton Foster Care is required to
inspect and evaluate foster homes to insure continued
compliance with [DPW] regulations on an annual basis.”) with
55 Pa. Code § 3700.66 (outlining DPW’s “[f]oster family
residence requirements”).
20

Compare J.A. 558 (outlining the Home’s “Children’s
Grievance Procedure”) with 55 Pa. Code § 3130.88 (“The
county agency shall develop and implement a written policy and
procedure governing the filing of a grievance by children placed
in the foster homes and child care facilities that it operates.”).
21

Compare J.A. 574 (“A vehicle used in transporting
children shall be validly licensed and inspected”; “[p]ersons
transporting children shall possess a valid driver’s license for
the class of vehicle the person is operating”; and “[t]he number
of persons in a vehicle used to transport children may not exceed
passenger capacity as determined by the vehicle manufacturer.”)
with 55 Pa. Code § 3130.89 (same).
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discipline 22 and training 23 requirements).
I.H. counters that not every provision in the Placement
Agreement and Handbook was a product of state regulations.
For instance, the Home included certain disciplinary practices
beyond those enumerated under Pennsylvania law. The Home
also exercised final authority over whether a child could partake
in certain childhood rights-of-passage, including holding a
summer job and driving a car. Finally, foster parents were
prohibited from “sign[ing] any papers or documents other than
school absence excuses, report cards[,] or items of a routine
nature.” I.H. contends that, even if Universal Am-Can applied,
these additional provisions, among many others, would be
enough to establish a master-servant relationship. We disagree.

22

Compare J.A. 563-64 (“Foster children shall be directed
with techniques that stress praise and encouragement . . .”;
“[f]oster children may not be subjected to verbal abuse,
derogatory remarks, or threats of removal from the foster
home”; and “[p]assive physical restraint techniques are the only
allowable method of physically intervening with an
uncontrollable child’s behavior.”) with 55 Pa. Code § 3700.63
(same).
23

Compare J.A. 585 (“Each foster parent must successfully
complete a minimum of ten (10) hours of approved training
annually.”) with 55 Pa. Code § 3700.65 (“A foster parent shall
participate in a minimum of 6 hours of agency approved
training.”).
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Universal Am-Can does not mean that all requirements
within an agreement must be the product of government
regulations. Instead, in this case we must consider the foster
care agency-foster parent relationship in light of related state
regulations, as well as the provisions imposed by the Home
itself.
3.

The Relationship Between Foster Care Agencies,
Foster Parents, and Foster Children Under
Pennsylvania Law

The relationship between a foster care agency and a
foster parent is unlike that of the typical master and servant.24
Within the framework provided by the agency, foster parents are
given considerable latitude in meeting the goals of each child’s
individual service plan.
This is by design, as the
Commonwealth requires placements that, as much as possible,
“replicate . . . the traditional family setting[].” 55 Pa. Code

24

The Kansas Supreme Court recognized as much when it
was considering the related question of whether a foster parent
should be considered a state employee for purposes of vicarious
liability. The Court observed, “The foster parent’s actual status
is . . . unique and does not actually fit within either [the label
‘employee’ or ‘independent contractor’].
A more apt
description . . . would be more of an expense-reimbursed
volunteer who must be licensed and who operates within certain
guidelines.” Mitzner, 891 P.2d at 438.
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§ 3130.67(b)(7)(i). Implicit in the foster parent-foster child
relationship is a level of parental autonomy that permits foster
parents, on a daily basis, to adjust their care to the individualized
needs of their foster child, just as biological parents would in a
“traditional family setting.”
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently provided
guidance in assessing relationships that are similarly
“individualized” and “dynamic.” In Valles, the plaintiff brought
a claim against a hospital “premised . . . upon a theory of
vicarious liability for the battery committed by [the doctor] due
to his failure to obtain informed consent prior to performing [an]
aortogram.” 805 A.2d at 1234. The plaintiff argued that,
“[b]ecause a hospital has an obligation to oversee all persons
who practice medicine within its walls, . . . [it] as an employer
and health care provider in its own right maintains a right of
control in the relationship sufficient to justify the imposition of
liability.” Id. at 1236.
The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the hospital, concluding that the relationship between
it and a staff radiologist in the context of informed consent was
not that of a “master” and its “servant.” This was despite the
hospital exercising much control over the radiologist, including:
its provision of the instrumentalities, place to
work, support staff, patient base and wages; its
right to require the employee’s presence at a
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particular time[,] and to terminate his
employment; its retention of revenues for the
employee’s professional services; and its use of
departmental organization, peer review, rules and
regulations, credentialing[,] and privileging
practices.
Id. at 1238. As the plaintiffs argued, the doctor’s “exercise of
independent medical judgment was subject to [the hospital’s]
right of control because: his work may not be delegated to others
. . . ; his medical findings must be reported in a manner . . . set
by hospital policy; and he must perform the requested study
according to departmental protocols . . . .” Id.
The Court nonetheless declined to recognize a masterservant relationship, holding “as a matter of law [that] a medical
facility lacks the control over the manner in which the physician
performs his duty to obtain informed consent so as to render the
facility vicariously liable.” Id. at 1239. It explained that “a
medical facility cannot maintain control over this aspect of the
physician-patient relationship,” since “[i]nformed consent flows
from the discussions each patient has with his physician, based
on the facts and circumstances each case presents.” Id. The
baseline was that it would be “improvident and unworkable” to
“interject an element of a hospital’s control into this highly
individualized and dynamic relationship.” Id.
We conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
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analysis in Valles should apply equally to the relationship
between a foster care agency and its foster parent. Given the
“highly individualized” and “dynamic” adjustments that foster
parents must make in fulfilling the ongoing obligations to their
foster children, it would be similarly “improvident and
unworkable” to “interject an element of the [foster agency’s]
control into” such a relationship.25
4.

Conclusion

Under its Service Contract, Lehigh County assigned to
the Home the duty of selecting and approving prospective foster
parents, assisting the County with suitable placements,

25

I.H. also argues that our decision should be informed by
M.B. v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 00-5223, 2003 WL
1144307 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2003). In this unpublished District
Court opinion, a male with a criminal record, who was permitted
to live in the foster home by the foster parent, sexually molested
the foster child. The foster care agency was contractually bound
to evaluate changes in family composition and admittedly knew
of the man’s presence. In spite of this knowledge, the agency
failed to perform a background check on him. Though the
District Court noted that the foster parent and the foster care
agency had an agency relationship, it did not base its decision
“on the existence of an employee-employer (or servant-master)
relationship.” Id. at *2 n.2. Moreover, the case involved an
intentional tort against the foster child rather than an allegedly
negligent act. Thus we do not follow the path it points.
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monitoring these placements, and submitting to the County
individual service plans and various reports tracking each foster
child. Although this provided the Home with a great deal of
control over its foster parents, it fell short of imposing a “right
of control” over the manner in which foster parents provided
foster care to their foster children on a daily basis. The Home’s
Placement Agreement with the Nortons presented general
guidelines for foster care and incorporated specific provisions
of the Service Contract and state regulations. Instead of
subjecting Norton to the continuous control of the Home, these
documents generally addressed the results of the work and not
the manner in which it was conducted. It gave the Home a
broad supervisory role, but not the right to control the daily
activities of the Norton family. On a daily basis, the Nortons
decided how to meet I.H.’s physical, social, and emotional needs
themselves. This was by design.
One of the key goals of the Pennsylvania foster care
system “is to replicate as closely as possible the traditional
family settings in which children are cared for and raised.”
Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir. 2005). This goal
limits the scope of control that the foster care agency may
exercise over its foster parents on a daily basis. Indeed, too
much control over the day-to-day activities of foster families
would make it impossible “to replicate . . . the traditional family
setting[].” Id. Therefore, even with the level of control that the
Home may have exercised under the Placement Agreement, the
Nortons still exercised largely the same level of control over
37

I.H.’s day-to-day life as they did over their biological children.
As the District Court noted, the Nortons still decided “the
activities I.H. would engage in . . . , the food he would eat, [and]
the books he would read.” In addition, “[n]o one controlled
what time the Nortons must awake I.H. in the morning, what
time they must feed him, what time he must go to sleep, and
what tasks or activities he should be doing at any given
moment.” For goals outlined by the Home, the Nortons were
largely free to accomplish them as they saw fit. For items not
contained in the Placement Agreement or the Handbook, the
Nortons were free to treat I.H. as they would their biological
children.
Of course, the Nortons were constrained in important
ways by the Placement Agreement, and they were subjected to
consistent monitoring by the Home. Nonetheless the Nortons
still had a great deal of discretion on a daily basis over how to
care for I.H. Much as the doctor-patient relationship in Valles,
the foster parent-foster child relationship in this case was
“highly individualized” and “dynamic,” making it similarly
“improvident” and “unworkable” to exercise a high level of
control over the relationship. Moreover, such control would be
inconsistent with the regulatory regime imposed by the
Commonwealth.
*

*

*

*

*

For these reasons, we hold that a master-servant
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relationship did not exist between the Home and Norton. Hence
the Home was not vicariously liable for Norton’s ordinary
negligence at issue in this appeal.
We therefore affirm.
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